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Major League Baseball and the
National Collegiate Athletic
Association: Private Lotteries and
Enforceable Contracts
ABSTRACT

This Note argues that both the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) and Major League Baseball (MLB) have run or
continue to run contests for playoff tickets that constitute lotteries
under state law. For a contest to be considered a lottery in New York
and Indiana, there must be a prize, consideration,and chance. Both of
these schemes meet these three requirements, because entrants pay a
non-refundable fee for a chance to purchase a playoff ticket to games at
a time when the face value of the ticket will likely be much lower than
the market value of the ticket.
However, in George v. NCAA, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled
that the NCAA ticket contest did not constitute a lottery because there
was no prize involved. The court found that where the creator of the
event determines the face value of the ticket, the market value of the
ticket would be the stated face value at the time of the contest. The
court cited no economic theory or precedent for this holding, and it goes
against what courts have held in other contexts where the face value of
the item in question does not equal the market value of the item in
question. This ruling vacated the Seventh Circuit opinion, which had
held that since the market value of the ticket was higher than the face
value of the ticket that there was a prize involved.
In the future, courts should follow the analysis proposed in the
Seventh Circuit's vacated NCAA v. George opinion rather than the
analysis used by the Indiana Supreme Court. Courts should view both
the NCAA and MLB ticket contests, and other similar schemes sure to
arise in the future, as illegal lotteries run in violation of the
organizations' respective state laws. By doing so, courts will protect
uninformed contestants and slow the proliferation of these types of
contests. An organization may continue to hold similar contests in the
future, but if an organization chooses to do so, it must return the
consideration the contestants paid to enter the contest to those
contestants who do not win the prize. When the organization returns
395
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the consideration, the organization will not be conducting an illegal
lottery because there cannot be a lottery without prize, chance, and
consideration. Returning the consideration allows the winner to
purchase tickets at a price that he believes is fair at the time he enters
the contest and returns the loser to the same position that he was in
when he entered into the contest.
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Imagine a situation where a person is able to pay five dollars to
participate in a raffle in which the winner receives $500. That is
exactly what happens in an everyday state-run lottery.' Now imagine
a situation where a person pays a five-dollar non-refundable handling
fee and a forty-dollar refundable payment for a chance to win the right
to use the forty-dollar refundable payment to purchase a forty-dollar
face value ticket to a sporting event, when the ticket has a market
value of $540 at the time of purchase. This type of contest functions
just like any state-run lottery; in both cases, the winner receives the
opportunity to take away a prize worth $500 while the losers are out
five dollars.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and
Major League Baseball (MLB) have both run ticket contests where the
above scenario occurs. 2 The NCAA put an end to its ticket lottery
program in 2010 after angry fans filed lawsuits challenging the
practice in state and federal court. 3 The US Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law under diversity jurisdiction,
ultimately held that the NCAA ticket lottery was an illegal lottery in
NCAA v. George.4 However, the Seventh Circuit vacated the opinion
and certified questions to the Indiana Supreme Court.5 The Indiana
Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion, finding that the
contest was not a lottery because there was no prize involved. 6

See, e.g., How to Play, TENNESSEE LOTTERY, http://www.tnlottery.com/howtoplay/
1.
default.aspx#power (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
2.
Judith L. Grubner, NCAA Ticket Lottery Subject To Potential Nationwide Class
Action, ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP (July 23, 2010), http://legalnews.arnstein.com/2010/07/23/ncaaticket-lottery-subject-to-potential-nationwide-class-action; Mark Newman, Postseason Ticket
Reservations Introduced: System Guarantees Fans Opportunity to Buy Tickets at Face Value,
MLB.COM (June 30, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20100629&
content id=11714326.
Andrew M. Harris, NCAA Must Face Ticket Lottery Suit, U.S. Appeals Court in
3.
Chicago Rules, BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2010-0716/u-s-appeals-court-revives-fans-ncaa-championship-ticket-lottery-case.html.
4.
See George v. NCAA (George 1), 613 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th
Cir. 2010).
5.
George v. NCAA (George 11), 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
6.
George v. NCAA (George Ill), 945 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2011).
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As the legality of the NCAA program played out in court, MLB
instituted a similar ticket program in June 2010.1 MLB frames its
contest as "investing in futures. Sure, there is some degree of chance
involved. Competitive balance is great in 2010, and there will no
doubt be frantic finishes throughout the standings."8 Just as the
NCAA's contest satisfies the three elements of an illegal lottery under
Indiana law,9 the MLB scheme satisfies the three elements of an
illegal lottery under New York law: (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3)
consideration given for the chance to win.1 0 Although the MLB ticket
lottery has yet to face a legal challenge, its program is certainly
vulnerable to attack in the same way that the NCAA scheme and
other similar schemes remain subject to attack, as New York common
law and Indiana common law address lottery issues in almost exactly
the same way."
This Note argues that the Indiana Supreme Court ignored
reality and failed to adequately address whether there is a prize
involved in the NCAA contest. Thus, the MLB and NCAA contests
and similar schemes are illegal lotteries. The vacated Seventh Circuit
opinion in NCAA v. George should be reinstated and followed in other
jurisdictions, while the Indiana Supreme Court decision should be
ignored and overturned. Part I examines the legal background
against which courts will consider these contests. Part II shows that
neither the MLB contest nor the NCAA contest constitutes an
enforceable contract. Part III proposes that to avoid illegal lottery
status in the future, MLB and other groups who use similar schemes
should return the consideration paid to enter the contest-the five
dollars in the above example-to those participants who do not receive
tickets under the program.
I. NCAA AND MLB PROCEDURES AND US GAMBLING POLICY
This Part begins by explaining the ticket contest that the
NCAA ran in the past and the contest that MLB currently runs. It
then explains the legal history of gambling in the United States, as
7.
Newman, supra note 2.
8.
Id.
9.
See George I, 613 F.3d at 661.
10.
Harris v. Economic Opportunity Comm'n, Inc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914 (N.Y. App.
Term 1989) (identifying the three factors that New York courts use to determine whether a
lottery exists). The NCAA is headquartered in Indiana. Contact Us, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/home/contact+the+ncaa (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). The MLB is
headquartered in New York. Major League Baseball Headquartersin New York, United States,
TOP Box DESIGN (June 19, 2010), http://www.topboxdesign.com/major-league-baseballheadquarters-in-new-york-united-states.
11.
Compare Harris,542 N.Y.S.2d at 914, with George 1, 613 F.3d at 661.

2012]

PRIVATE LOTTERIES AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS

399

well as current law in the states of Indiana (NCAA headquarters) and
New York (MLB headquarters). This part then focuses on whether
courts can classify these contests as something other than a lottery,
including: unenforceable wagers, securities, futures contracts, option
contracts, and forward contracts. It also analyzes whether the MLB
scheme, if otherwise a legal transaction, is subject to challenge under
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006. This part
concludes by discussing the in pari delicto exception, which focuses on
whether MLB or the NCAA can enforce these contracts against
potential plaintiffs even if courts find that this type of contest
constitutes a lottery.
A. The NCAA Ticket Contest and the MLB Scheme
The NCAA ticket contest, which no longer exists today, allowed
applicants to enter for a chance to win Final Four tickets for
basketball or hockey by paying full face value for the desired number
of tickets, plus a six-dollar service charge per entry. 12 Applicants
could submit up to ten entries but could only win two tickets.1 3 If the
applicant won the drawing, the applicant received the tickets and the
NCAA retained the ticket price plus the service charge.14 If the
applicant did not win, the NCAA refunded the face value of the tickets
to the applicant but retained the service fee.16
Similarly, the MLB ticket procedure allows a fan to purchase
the right to buy seats at face value if the fan's chosen team hosts the
selected playoff game.16 To reserve a seat, the fan must pay both a
non-refundable service fee and a transaction fee to MLB.17 For
National League Divisional Series games, the service fee is ten dollars
per ticket, plus a one-dollar transaction fee. 8 For National League
Championship Series games, the fee is fifteen dollars per ticket, plus a
one-dollar transaction fee.' 9 For World Series games, the fee is twenty
dollars per ticket, plus a one-dollar transaction fee. 20 For example, if a
fan wants to buy tickets to the second home game that the
Philadelphia Phillies host in the National League Championship
Series, the fan can purchase up to two seat reservations for that game
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Grubner, supra note 2.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Newman, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for thirty dollars plus the one-dollar transaction fee. 21 If the Phillies
make it to the National League Championship Series, then the fan
will be able to purchase two tickets for Philadelphia's second home
game at face value. 22 As with the NCAA ticket lottery, the service fee
and transaction fee are not refunded, regardless of the outcome. 23
B. Gambling in General
Laws proscribing gambling in the United States date back to
1833.24 Every state in the United States banned lotteries from 1894
until 1964.25 Due to shifts in public policy over time, forty-four states
currently hold state-run lotteries. 26 States have the authority to
regulate gambling and lotteries as part of their police powers,
designed to allow states-rather than the federal government-"to
protect the public health, public morals, public safety, or public
welfare." 27 For example, the common law rule of New York bars the
enforcement of gambling contracts, acknowledging that they are
illegal and void in much of the United States. 28 Likewise, public policy
is against private, as opposed to state-run, gambling because it
"affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or
honesty in the operation of the gambling devices." 29
Enforcing gambling-related legislation proves to be difficult, 30
and there is a growing movement to relax laws aimed at gambling. 31
21.

Newman, supra note 2.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

ROGER DUNSTAN, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA (1997),

available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt2.html ("The attack against gambling was
focused particularly on lotteries because it represented a form of wagering that was offensive to
both the moral sensibilities of reformers, and the Jacksonian resentment toward privilege. . . . In
1833 Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts put an end to state authorized lotteries. By
1840, most states had banned lotteries. By 1860, only Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky still
allowed state-authorized lotteries." (footnote omitted)).
25.

Id.

26.
See, e.g., Elise Hu, Lottery Deal Bid Process Is Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/us/21ttlottery.html.
27.
F.A.C.E. Trading, Inc. v. Carter, 821 N.E.2d 38, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting
Jack Eiser Sales Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 752 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
28.
Id. at 15.
Intercont'l Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 15 (1964).
29.
30.
FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1954) ("tStates] have been
plagued with as many types of lotteries as the seemingly inexhaustible ingenuity of their
promoters could devise in their efforts to circumvent the law. . . . So varied have been the
techniques used by promoters to conceal the joint factors of prize, chance, and consideration, and
so clever have they been in applying these techniques to feigned as well as legitimate business
activities, that it has often been difficult to apply the decision of one case to the facts of
another.").
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One of the driving forces behind this movement is a counter argument
to the public policy against gambling: the public policy supporting an
individual's freedom to contract. 32 Courts today are more likely to
interpret a transaction between two willing parties as a valid,
enforceable contract rather than as an unenforceable wager. 33 While
some courts accept that it is the legislature's role to determine
whether public policy has shifted over time, 34 other courts find that in
the absence of a stated legislative policy, a court may weigh the
interests involved to determine whether public policy deems certain
agreements unenforceable. 3 5
1. Relevant Indiana and New York Lottery Laws
The NCAA is headquartered in Indianapolis, so it must abide
by Indiana law. 36 In Indiana, a person or entity may not knowingly or
intentionally conduct a lottery. 37 Indiana defines a lottery as "a
scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance." 3 8 Indiana
requires a plaintiff to show three elements to establish a lottery: (1)
consideration given to enter the contest, (2) an element of chance, and
(3) a prize. 39
MLB is headquartered in New York City, so it must abide by
New York law. 4 0 The New York Constitution declares that lotteries
not run by the state and authorized by the legislature are illegal. 41
New York common law, however, prohibits any scheme that functions
as a lottery-no matter the name that the promoters give to the
31.
See DUNSTAN, supra note 24.
32.
Baltimore & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505-06 (1900) (quoting
Printing& Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875)).
33.
Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., 561 A.2d 1248, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(Popovich, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should not turn a blind eye to wagering contracts
barred by the legislature; noting that the fact that gambling transactions in violation of statutory
law occur every day without punishment is no reason for the court to allow a gambling contract
to be enforceable when the contract reaches the court).
34.
See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979).
35.
Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ind. 1997); see also In re Sprinzen
(Nomberg), 46 N.Y.2d 623, 628 (1979) ("Public policy, like society, is continually evolving and
those entrusted with its implementation must respond to its everchanging demands.").
36.
Contact Us, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcmi/connect/public/NCAA/Home/
Contact+the+NCAA (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
37.
IND. CODE § 35-45-5-3 (2010).
38.
Lesher v. Baltimore Football Club, 496 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting Kaszuba v. Zientara, 495 N.E.2d 761, 763 (Ind. Ct. App.); Tinder v. Music Operating,
Inc., 142 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1957)), vacated in part, 512 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. 1987).
39.
George I, 613 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
40.
Official Info: Terms of Use Agreement, MLB.CoM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official
info/aboutmlb com/terms of use.jsp (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
41.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.

402

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:2:395

scheme-to prevent circumvention of the law through technicalities. 4 2
As in Indiana, there are three elements under New York common law
to an unlawful lottery: (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) a prize. 4 3
The only difference between New York and Indiana law is the
possibility in New York, as explained below, that the lottery must
involve a physical ticket for the contest to qualify as a lottery. 44
Because courts in Indiana and New York identify the three main
elements of lottery in the same fashion-prize, consideration, and
chance-this Note analyzes both New York and Indiana case law
interchangeably when discussing those three elements. Below, this
Note briefly addresses the possibility that New York may, in addition
to the three main elements, require a ticket for the contest to
constitute a lottery.
The first element of an illegal lottery is valuable consideration,
which "may consist of some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given,
suffered or undertaken by the other."4 5 If persons can participate in a
contest without permanently giving up valuable consideration, the
contest will not be a lottery.4 6 Many lottery cases turn on whether
participants pay consideration to enter a game of chance.47 In a
situation where participants can-without giving consideration-sign
a ledger in a theater in order to be eligible for a prize (even though
some of the people who enter the contest also purchase tickets to see a
show in the theater), there is no lottery. 48 This type of scheme does
not meet the consideration element because people may enter the
contest for free. 49 Where only people who pay admission to the theater
are eligible to win the prize, that contest will constitute an illegal
lottery.50

42.
People v. Cadle, 114 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (Crim. Ct. 1952). This flexibility also keeps
the New York legislature from having to update its lottery laws each time a "new and novel
scheme" is developed. Id.
43.
Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm'n, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (App. Div. 1991).
44.
Dalton v. Pataki (Pataki 1), 780 N.Y.S.2d 47, 71 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd in part, 835
N.E.2d 1180 (N.Y. 2005).
45.
Holt v. Feigenbaum, 52 N.Y.2d 291, 299 (1981) (quoting Rector of St. Mark's Church
v. Teed, 24 N.E. 1014 (N.Y. 1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Harris, 575 N.Y.S.2d
at 675.
46.
People v. Cadle, 180 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579-80 (App. Div. 1958).
47.
See, e.g., People v. Shafer, 289 N.Y.S. 649, 652-53 (Crim. Ct. 1936) (holding that
requiring participants in a drawing to be present in order to win does not alone constitute
valuable consideration, where participants were aware that they undertook no other obligations).
48.
Id. at 651-52.
49.
Id.
50.
People v. Miller, 2 N.E.2d 38, 47-48 (N.Y. 1936).
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The second element of a lottery is chance, which includes any
contest where the outcome is determined by uncertainty and/or
randomness. 5 1 In addition, a contest does not become a lottery merely
because the contestant's judgment may insignificantly affect the
results. 52 Courts presume chance for schemes that involve a random
drawing or bingo.5 3 Even where it is certain that each contestant will
receive a prize, chance exists where the value of the good in question
depends on the order in which the recipient wins. 54
The third element of a lottery is a prize, which is something of
more value than the amount invested.5 5 This includes a reward of a
tangible good or of money.56 A reward is a prize where the market
value of the item is greater than the total price paid to enter the
contest, including any service and transaction fees.5 7 If participants
give consideration in exchange for the right to attend an event at
which prizes are given away, but the consideration is not
commensurate with the value of the event itself, the game may still be
a lottery.58 For example, a sale of tickets to see a movie in a theater
can constitute a lottery if attendees may win a prize during the show
and the cost to attend that show is higher than the cost to attend the
show where no prizes are given away. 59
2. Relevant Precedent
In George v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit found that the NCAA
ticket lottery contained all three elements of an illegal lottery under
Indiana law: consideration, prize, and chance. 60 The consideration
was a six-dollar, non-refundable service fee. paid on every
transaction. 61 The prize was the ticket, because the petitioner proved
that the market value of the ticket was much greater than the face
value paid by those who won the game. 62 Finally, chance was found

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00 (McKinney 2011).
51.
Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 326-27 (Sup. ct. 1966) (quoting People ex
52.
rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755 (N.Y. 1904)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Tinder
v. Music Operating, Inc., 142 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ind. 1957).
53.
See, e.g., People v. Williams, 113 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (Crim. Ct. 1952).
Carl Co. v. Lennon, 148 N.Y.S. 375, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
54.
Lesher v. Baltimore Football Club, 496 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986),
55.
vacated in part, 512 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. 1987).
People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (Crim. Ct. 1939).
56.
57.
George I, 613 F.3d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
See id.
58.
Id. at 662.
59.
Id. at 662-65.
60.
Id. at 662.
61.
Id.
62.
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because the number of entries into the contest was greater than the
total supply of tickets. 63
However, the Seventh Circuit later vacated its opinion and
certified three questions for review by the Indiana Supreme Court. 64
The Seventh Circuit believed that the contest was a lottery, but
ultimately decided to certify questions to the Indiana Supreme Court
because the Seventh Circuit was interpreting a matter of Indiana
state law.6 5 The Seventh Circuit was also concerned about the
decision]
on
effects
[of
its
possible
"far-reaching
sports-ticket-distribution systems utilized by the NCAA and others." 66
The Indiana Supreme Court's opinion only reached the first
certified question, which dealt with whether the NCAA scheme, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, constituted a lottery under Indiana law. 6 7
The court found that "where an event coordinator creates the primary
market for event tickets, the fair-market value of the tickets is equal
to their face value."68 In other words, the value of the tickets equaled
the amount the winners paid, removing the prize element necessary to
find an illegal lottery under Indiana common law. The court did not
cite to any precedent or economic theory in making this
determination. 6 9 The Indiana Supreme Court's holding does not
prevent a prosecutor or petitioner from attacking a similar scheme
when someone uses it as a ruse to conduct a traditional lottery. 70
There is no precedent in any jurisdiction, other than the
vacated Seventh Circuit George decision, that declares that a prize
exists where the market value of a good is greater than the face value
of the item in question.7 1 Other jurisdictions have addressed the
differences in market value and face value, but only as it relates to the
value of stolen property in a criminal proceeding. 72 For example, New
Mexico follows a rule similar to the one advanced in the vacated

Id.
63.
64.
George II, 623 F.3d 1135, 1137 (7th Cir. 2010).
65.
Id. at 1137-38.
66.
Id. at 1137.
67.
George III, 945 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. 2011) (listing the other two certified questions
accepted by the Court: (1) "If the plaintiffs' allegations describe an unlawful lottery, would the
NCAA's method for allocating tickets fall within the Ind. Code § 35-45-5-1(d) exception for 'bona
fide business transactions that are valid under the law of contracts'?"; (2) "If the plaintiffs'
allegations describe an unlawful lottery, do plaintiffs' allegations show that their claims are
subject to an in pari delicto defense as described in Lesher v. Baltimore Football Club, 496
N.E.2d 785, 790 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), and Swain v. Bussell, 10 Ind. 438, 442 (1858)?").
68.
Id. at 160.
69.
See id.
70.
Id.
71.
George I, 613 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
72.
State v. Contreras, 915 P.2d 306, 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
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George case. 73 In State v. Contreras, the defendant allegedly stole a
necklace with a face value of $600.74 Store employees testified that
jewelry often sold for 50 to 60 percent below face value.7 5 The court
ruled that the value of stolen property should be defined as "the price
at which the property could ordinarily be bought or sold at the time of
the alleged offense." 76 Washington and New York also follow this
approach in determining the value of a stolen good for the purposes of
a criminal trial.77 In the future, when a jurisdiction determines
whether a prize exists in a lottery context, that jurisdiction should
follow these precedents that focus on the market value of the item,
rather than the stated face value of the item.
C. Legitimate Business Transactions,Enforceable Contracts, Wagers,
Lotteries, and the Internet
This Section addresses whether the MLB or NCAA may enforce
the contests if they do not constitute lotteries. If the contests are not
lotteries, the question becomes whether they are legitimate business
transactions, some other type of enforceable contract, or unenforceable
wagers. Legitimate business transactions, for the purposes of this
Note, include: securities, futures, forwards, and options. Below, this
Note provides the framework for determining into which category, if
any, these schemes fall.
1. Legitimate Business Transactions: Securities, Futures, Forwards,
and Options
If courts determine that the MLB, NCAA, and other similar
schemes do not constitute lotteries, then they will have to determine
whether the contests are unenforceable wagers, legitimate business
transactions, or some other type of enforceable contract. The four
most likely legitimate business transactions for these schemes are
securities, futures, forwards, and options.
Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 to protect
investors, while also considering capital formation, competition, and
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 307.
Id.
75.
Id. at 308.
76.
77.
People v. Irrizari, 156 N.E.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. 1959) (finding that market value is
determined by "the price at which [the goods] would probably have been sold in the regular
course of busines[s] at the time when and the place where they were stolen."); State v. Kleist, 895
P.2d 398, 400-01 (Wash. 1995) (finding that the ultimate issue is what a consumer what would
be willing to pay; noting, however, that in criminal cases the value of a ticket for something such
as a sporting event is limited by Washington statutory law to the retail value of the ticket).
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promotion of efficiency.7 8 The Securities and Exchange Commission
enforces the Securities Act. 7 9 Investments subject to the Act are
securities, including "any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
bond,

debenture,...

investment contract,...

option,

...

or

[any]

'security."'80

In Howey, the
instrument commonly known as a
Supreme Court states that investment contracts are schemes that
involve "an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
to come solely from the efforts of others."8 1 Profits are money that the
investor seeks for himself as the return on his investment. 82 These
profits must come as a result of work by other parties to increase the
investment's value.8 3 The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
adds that "[tihe critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence of
investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's
efforts." 84
A futures contract is "[a] contractual agreement . .. to buy or

sell a particular commodity or financial instrument at a
pre-determined price in the future."85
The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) has exclusive jurisdiction over futures
contracts.8 6 The primary purpose of the CFTC is to ensure "fair
practice and honest dealing and to provide some control over excessive
speculative activity which causes injury to producers, consumers and
the exchanges."8 7 When dealing with futures contracts, there does not
have to be physical delivery of the commodity in question.88 Offsetting
contracts between brokers has the legal effect of delivery, and courts
consider a contract for this purpose to be a valid business purpose. 89
Courts more readily view futures contracts as a type of common stock
rather than as a vehicle through which people agree to trade goods at
a future date. 90 Courts will only find that an instrument constitutes a

78.
79.

15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006).
Id. § 78d.

80.
Id. § 77b(a)(1).
81.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
82.
See id.
Id.
83.
84.
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
85.
Futures
Contract,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/
futurescontract.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
86.
Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (D.
Nev. 1980).
87.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202, 206 (N.D. Ala.
1981).
88.
Id. at 205.
Id.
89.
90.
Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville, Inc. v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 81 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010).
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futures contract if the contract trades on an exchange designated or
registered by the CFTC. 91
A forward contract contemplates actual delivery of the good in
question-that the contract will ultimately lead to an exchange of
goods for money. 92 Neither the CFTC nor the SEC regulates forward
contracts, 93 because the Act intends that the SEC and CFTC only
govern speculative markets. 94 A forward contract is typically one in
which: "(1) [tjhe contract specifies idiosyncratic terms regarding place
of delivery, quantity, or other terms . . . (2) [tlhe contract is between

industry

participants .. . rather

speculators .

..

than

arbitrageurs

and

other

[and] (3) [d]elivery cannot be deferred forever [due to

penalties]." 95 While none of these factors by themselves determine
whether the contract is future or forward, if the contract does not
require actual, physical delivery then the contract will not be a
forward contract. 96
An option contract gives the holder of the option the right to
buy or sell the underlying security on or before the date that the
option expires.97 At the time they contract, the parties negotiate a
"strike price": the amount for which the security can be bought (for
"call options") or sold (for "put options"). 98 Changes in the market
price of the underlying stock influence whether the holder of an option
contract buys for a call option or sells for a put option.9 9 The
option-holder pays some amount less than the value of the property in
question for the ability to convert an offeror's immediate offer to sell
(or buy) into an irrevocable offer to sell (or buy) for some amount of
time. 100 Once the holder exercises the option, the option contract
becomes an executed contract.101
Courts view the variations in value during an option contract
in terms of risk and the chance that the good in question ultimately
changes hands. 102 The offeror transfers risk (such as risk of
of the underlying stock) to the offeree for
devaluation

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504 (3d Cir. 1988).

98.

See id.

Id.
99.
100.
Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ind. 1996).
101.
Id.
102.
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
Perillo, rev. ed. 2011).

§

86.17, at 15-86 (Joseph M.
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consideration-as opposed to a wagering transaction, where the
formation of the contract itself creates new risk.103
2. Enforceable Contracts, Wagers, and Lotteries
Due to variations in state law, it is possible that a contest
constitutes an illegal lottery even where the contest is not a wager. 104
This is because separate sections of state gambling laws can regulate
wagers and lotteries. 0 5 All lotteries constitute a type of gambling, but
not all forms of gambling constitute lotteries. 106
Both Indiana and New York recognize that a lottery is a subset
of gambling.107 Indiana declares all gambling, including lottery,
illegal. 108 New York's Constitution states that "no lottery or the sale
of lottery tickets, pool-selling, book-making, or any other kind of
gambling, except lotteries operated by the state" shall be legal. 109
Thus, in New York a lottery is a separate type of gambling offense,
because the term lottery is set out in a list of specific terms that, as a
whole, make up the general term of gambling.1 1 0 Therefore, when a
court reviews these contests, Indiana and New York law requires the
court to determine whether the NCAA and MLB schemes are
wagering contracts, lotteries, both, or neither.
An aleatory contract is one that, by its terms, is enforceable
only after the occurrence of a future event.1"1 If the conditional event
never occurs, the parties do not have to perform their obligations
under the contract. 112 Some aleatory contracts are wagering contracts,
and others are not.113 The key characteristics of wagering contracts,
which are unenforceable, are: conditional performance, no subsequent
consideration required for the performance if the conditional event

Id.
103.
104.
See Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DCM), 2007 WL 1797648, at *8-9
(D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (finding that even though the plaintiff asserted that each element of a
lottery was present in the defendant's scheme, since the plaintiff challenged the scheme under
the gambling laws, rather than the lottery laws, the lottery law was irrelevant).
105.
Id.
See Michael William Eisenrauch, Note, Video Poker and the Lottery Clause: Where
106.
Common Law and Common Sense Collide, 49 S.C. L. REV. 549, 567 (1998).
Pataki I, 780 N.Y.S.2d 47, 69 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 1180 (N.Y.
107.
2005); IND. CODE § 35-45-5-2 (2011).
108.
Id.
109.
N.Y. CONST art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
110.
Dalton v. Pataki (Pataki II), 835 N.E. 1180, 1192-93 (N.Y. 2005).
111.
CORBIN, supranote 102, §86.17.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
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occurs, and assumption of a risk that the bargain creates by the

promisor.114
In recent years, states have begun to clarify the differences
between unenforceable wagers and enforceable contracts.1 15 Where
"(1) the entry fees are paid unconditionally; (2) the prizes offered to. ..
contestants are for amounts certain and are guaranteed to be
awarded; and (3) [contest operators] do not compete for the prizes," the
transaction is not a wager. 116 The mere act of receiving and keeping
the consideration paid to enter a contest does not make the offeror the
winner of a "prize" of the contest.11 7
The New Jersey case, Humphrey v. Viacom, sets out the
framework to review possible wagers.11 8 According to the court's
reasoning, pay-to-play "fantasy football" leagues are enforceable
contracts rather than unenforceable wagers.119 Although contestants
pay entrance fees and compete for prizes, the offeror (here, Viacom)
does not compete for the prizes in question and provides substantial
services in the way of league administration to the competitors.120 The
Court states that "[t]o suggest that one can be a winner without
risking the possibility of being a loser defies logic and finds no support
in the law."121 A winner can only be one who "actually 'wagers, bets or
stakes' upon a race, game, or other unknown or contingent event." 122
Therefore, under Viacom, the offeror is not considered a winner
because he will not profit from the outcome of the contingent event.123
Regardless of the result of the event, the offeror has already secured
his profit by running the fantasy football league. 124 The participant
never risks losing his entry fee-he has already surrendered it to the
offeror per the contract-and the offeror's entitlement to the fee is not
contingent in any way on the outcome of the league. 2 5

114.
Id.
State v. Am. Holiday Ass'n, Inc., 727 P.2d 807, 810 (Ariz. 1986).
115.
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DCM), 2007 WL 1797648, at *9 (D.N.J.
116.
June 20, 2007)
117.
Id. at *9-10; see also Am. Holiday Ass'n, 727 P.2d at 810 ("Prize money, on the other
hand, is found where the money or other prize belongs to the person offering it, who has no
chance to win it and who is unconditionally obligated to pay it to the successful contestant.").
118.
Humphrey, 2007 WL 1797648, at *8.
119.
Id. at *8-9.
120.
Id. at *9.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at *10 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-1 (West 2011)).
123.
See id.
124.
See id.
125.
Id.
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3. Internet Wagers
While this Note focuses on state law and diversity jurisdiction,
this Note briefly addresses the possibility that a plaintiff may be able
to bring a claim against the MLB in federal court under the federal
Under the Unlawful Internet Gambling
question doctrine.
Enforcement Act of 2006, the MLB procedure may be illegal because
the MLB playoff ticket procedure is run through an online website. 126
The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act allows
regulators to prevent completion of qualifying Internet-based
gambling transactions. 12 7 The Act defines unlawful Internet gambling
as where a party transmits a bet or wager through the Internet, and
the bet or wager is illegal under Federal or State law in the state in
which the bet is initiated or received. 128 Under an exemption from the
law for online-based fantasy sports, the statute states that the
exemption fails if any winning outcome is based on the actual
performance of any one single team or group of teams, as compared to
individual players. 129

D. In Pari Delicto: Can Any Past Participantsin the Scheme Recover if
the Schemes are Illegal?
In pari delicto means-for contract purposes-that where both
parties are equally at fault in entering into an unenforceable contract,
the plaintiff may not recover what he advances in furtherance of the
unenforceable contract.13 0
It is an equitable defense that bars
recovery when the plaintiffs conduct is as bad as the defendant's
conduct in the eyes of the law. 13 1 The rule is based on the belief that
"(I) courts should not mediate disputes between wrongdoers and (II)
denying judicial relief to wrongdoers deters illegal conduct." 132
In the vacated Seventh Circuit George opinion, the court
stated, "the NCAA's act of knowingly conducting an unlawful lottery
demonstrates a greater degree of fault than Plaintiffs' act of
unwittingly entering that lottery." 133 The pleadings did not suggest a
mutual agreement to violate Indiana lottery law between the NCAA

126.

Newman, supra note 2.

127.

31 U.S.C §§ 5361, 5364 (2006).

128.
Id. § 5362(10)(A).
129.
Id. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(III)(aa).
Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts Fin. Group, Inc., 348 F.3d 230, 236 (7th Cir. 2003).
130.
131.
Symbol Techs., Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 0033150/2006, 2008 WL 4103244
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 16, 2008)
Id.
132.
133.
George 1, 613 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
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and the fans who entered the contest, and there was no indication that
the fans knew they were violating the lottery laws at the time they
entered into the contract. 134 After the Seventh Circuit vacated its
holding, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed to review whether the in
pari delicto defense would be colorable. 135 However, that question was
moot because the court found that there was no prize involved.136
II. ANALYSIS: THE NCAA AND MLB SCHEMES MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER STATE LAw To BE CONSIDERED LOTTERIES
AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS.
Courts should deem both the NCAA and MLB schemes
lotteries operating in violation of Indiana and New York law
respectively, because both schemes meet the requirements of chance,
prize, and consideration under those state's laws. However, assuming
courts find the schemes to not be lotteries, then the contracts will
likely be enforceable contracts rather than unenforceable wagers. In
addition, the in pari delicto doctrine will not prevent plaintiffs from
being able to recover against the NCAA and MLB if the contract
constitutes a lottery or an unenforceable wager.
A. The NCAA Scheme Functions as and Meets the Requirements to be a
Lottery under IndianaState Law.
This Note proposes that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision
in George incorrectly interprets Indiana law and that courts should
follow the interpretation set out by the Seventh Circuit in the vacated
George opinion. The Indiana Supreme Court held, "the critical fact ...
that no market for tickets exists until the event coordinator issues the
tickets in the first place, so, as a matter of law, the face value of the
tickets equals the fair-market value of the tickets on the primary
market." 137 Thus, the court found that there was no prize involved in
the contest. 138 The court cited no precedent or economic theory for this
reasoning. 139
This conclusion is fundamentally flawed. If other jurisdictions
choose to apply this theory, a contest organizer will be able to charge
any amount whatsoever for the right to enter a contest, so long as he
134.
George II, 623 F.3d 1135, 1137 (7th Cir. 2010).
George III, 945 N.E.2d 150, 160 (Ind. 2011).
135.
136.
George v. NCAA, No. 94S00-1010-CQ-544, 2010 WL 4361443, at *1-2 (Ind. Oct. 29,
2010); George II, 623 F.3d at 1138; George III, 945 N.E.2d at 160.
George III, 945 N.E.2d 150, 159 (Ind. 2011).
137.
138.
Id.
Id.
139.
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sets the face value for the contest prize in question and requires the
winner of the contest to purchase the item at that price. Thus, a
hypothetical car company named Zinga can set the face value of a
limited edition car, where the manufacturer produced 500 cars, at
$1,000. The only way to obtain the car is through the lottery. Zinga
can then set the cost to enter the contest at $1,020, and put no limit on
One thousand dollars will reflect the
the number of entrants.
purchase price, and twenty dollars will reflect the non-refundable
handling fee. By setting up the scheme in this fashion, Zinga can
potentially entice many more people to put in bids due to the low face
value price of the car. If a court follows the George precedent set by
the Indiana Supreme Court, the court will rule that the $1,000 rate is
the market value of the car since that is the face value Zinga set the
for the car-despite the fact that the average sale price of a new car in
the United States is $28,400.140 Moreover, as discussed above, states
have refused to assume that the face value of an item is equal to the
market value when the face value is not the price at which one can
buy the item on the open market. 141
Assuming that there is in fact a prize involved, the NCAA
scheme and similar contests clearly meet the two other requirements
to be a lottery under Indiana law. 142 There is consideration because of
the six-dollar non-refundable service fee paid on each entry. 143 There
is chance because the number of entrants into the lottery is greater
than the total supply of lottery tickets. 144 The original lawsuit against
the NCAA claims that the NCAA received more than 100,000
submissions for 2008 Final Four tickets, but awarded just 4,600
tickets. 145 Based on that figure, the NCAA earned between $600,000
and $1,000,000 on the service charges alone in 2008.146 Therefore, so
long as the Indiana Supreme Court's holding in George is overturned
on the prize issue, the NCAA scheme is an illegal lottery under
Indiana law because it will meet the factors of chance and
consideration.

140.
Facts for Consumers: Buying a New Car, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.
ftc.gov/bcp/edulpubs/consumer/autos/autil.shtm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
141.
George III, 945 N.E.2d at 160.
142.
George I, 613 F.3d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir.), vacated, 623 F.3d 1135 (7th Cir. 2010).
143.
Id. at 662.
Id.
144.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.; Grubner, supra note 2.
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B. The MLB Scheme Functions as and Meets the Requirements to Be a
Lottery under New York State Law.
The MLB procedure does not involve a random drawing, and
MLB refers to its procedure as "investing in futures."14 7 Functionally,
however, the MLB procedure operates in the same way as the NCAA
scheme. In the MLB scheme, the consideration is the non-refundable
service fee. 148 Chance lies in the fact that the team the fan picks may
not play in the selected game, in that the team may not make the
playoffs, or, in games five through seven of a seven game series, the
teams will not have to play if one team has already won four games. 149
The scheme meets the prize element because the fan who wins can
purchase a ticket at a face value that is likely to be much less than its
current market value.150 For example, tickets to the first playoff game
hosted by the Cincinnati Reds in 2010 were being resold for as much
as five times the face value, even for bleacher seats. 6 1 This situation
is very similar to what occurs in a Pick-Six lottery; in a Pick-Six
lottery, a person picks six numbers out of a set of numbers, usually
one through fifty, and if his six numbers are drawn, he wins the
lottery. 152 In Kaszuba v. Zientara-acase involving a Pick-Six lottery
ticket-the Indiana Supreme Court states, "[t]his case would not be
before this Court had not the numbers 6-15-16-23-24-37 been
selected." 153 Here, the only way a person can win in the MLB scheme
is to pick the correct team-the team that actually makes it to the
playoffs and plays in that specific game-and thus the MLB contest
functions much like a Pick-Six lottery ticket because it exchanges
individual teams for a set of six numbers. 154
However, under a narrow reading of lottery-and if New York
determines the holding of a ticket is an essential element to a

147.
Newman, supra note 2.
Id.; see Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau County, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d
148.
672, 675-76 (App. Div. 1991).
149.
Newman, supra note 2; see People v. Li Ai Hua, 885 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Crim. Ct.
2009).
Newman, supra note 2.
150.
151.
Cincinnati Reds 2010 Playoff Tickets-The Breakdown, BALLPARKSAVVY (Sept. 1,
http://www.ballparksavvy.com/1/post/2010/9/cincinnati-reds-2010-playoff-tickets-the2010),
breakdown.html; P.J. O'Keefe & John Matarese, Wow! High Prices for Sunday's Reds Game,
WCPO.COM (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.wcpo.com/dpp/sports/baseball/reds/where-to-find-redspostseason-tickets.
http://www.
NUMBERS,
WITH
and Payouts, WINNING
Odds
152.
Lottery
winningwitbnumbers.com/lottery/odds (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
153.
Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 1 (Ind. 1987).
154.
See Newman, supranote 2.
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lottery-then the MLB scheme might stand.15 5 In Mississippi, a bingo
is not a form of lottery under Knight v. State.156 The court based this
conclusion on statutory construction, as the Mississippi statute
barring private lotteries specifically notes that a lottery involves
tickets."' Thus, Mississippi takes a narrow reading of lottery, and
finds that a lottery involves tickets. 15 8 Although New York's statutory
scheme never mentions that there must be a ticket in order for there
to be a lottery, as the Mississippi statute does, there is precedent that
suggests New York could read this requirement into the statute. 15 9 If
New York follows the Dalton v. Pataki decision, rather than New
York's statutory law, the law will define a lottery as consisting of
"consideration, chance, prize, tickets and multiple participation."1 6 0
The question will be whether the requirement continues to be an
element of a lottery offense in New York in the future and how New
York defines the term ticket.
C. Neither the MLB nor the NCAA Scheme Are Legitimate Business
Transactions.
The contracts in question are not securities, futures, forwards,
or option contracts. These schemes have one element that is common
in most gambling transactions: A set amount of money is exchanged
between the parties with no effect on the total wealth of the group. 161
A speculative investment, on the other hand, is one in which wealth of
all the investors will increase or decrease in proportion to their
investments. 162
Neither the NCAA nor the MLB scheme fits the definition of a
security; the closest either comes to being a security is as an
investment contract. 163 For an investment contract, "[t]he critical
factor is not the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but rather
the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts." 164 Neither scheme

155.
Knight v. State, 574 So. 2d 662, 669 (Miss. 1990).
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
159.
Pataki I, 780 N.Y.S.2d 47, 71 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd in part, 835 N.E.2d 1180 (N.Y.
2005).
Id. at 74.
160.
161.
Lashbrook v. State, 550 N.E.2d 772, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
162.
163.
See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting
that an investment contract exists where a person invests money in a common enterprise with
the expectation that profits will be achieved solely from the efforts of a third party).
164.
Id. at 478.

2012]

PRIVATE LOTTERIES AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS

415

relies on the uniformity of the impact of the promoter's efforts.165 In
the NCAA scheme, the promoter selects winning tickets in a lottery
style fashion, which unquestionably leads to each investment being
affected differently. 166 In the MLB scheme, the promoter takes the
proceeds and waits for a contingent event to occur before doling out
the prizes.167 The outcomes of many events make up this contingent
event, and each event affects each investment differently. 6 8
In addition, neither scheme fits the requirements of a futures
contract, because in futures contracts the contract shuffles risk
between the parties rather than creating new risk.1 69 The NCAA
scheme creates risk in that it grants fewer tickets than there are
entries into the lottery.170 The MLB scheme creates risk as well:
When a fan purchases the right to buy a ticket, the fan buys a right
that has a value that depends on the outcome of a contingent event.' 7 '
The MLB scheme and the NCAA scheme are neither forward
contracts nor option contracts. Under a forward contract, both parties
contemplate actual delivery of the goods at some point in the future.172
The key to an option contract is that the holder of the option has the
right to exercise the option any time before the contract expires.173
And like a futures contract, an option contract is used to shuffle risk
between parties rather than to create new risk. 174 In both schemes,
delivery ultimately depends on a contingent event; the fan cannot
choose to exercise any kind of option before that contingent event
occurs, and the contracts create new risk. 175 Ultimately, the MLB
scheme depends on the team the fan chooses making the playoffs, and
the NCAA scheme the luck of the draw. 76 Therefore, neither scheme
constitutes a forward or an option contract.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
Ala. 1981).
170.
171.
172.
2010).
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.
See sources cited supra note 165.
See sources cited supra note 165.
See sources cited supra note 165.
See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D.
Grubner, supra note 2.
Newman, supranote 2.
Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville, Inc. v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 82 (Ind. Ct. App.
Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ind. 1996).
CORBIN, supranote 102, § 86.17.
Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.
See sources cited supra note 175.
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D. If Neither the NCAA nor the MLB Scheme Is Considered a Lottery,
they Both Will Likely Stand as Enforceable Contracts
Since the NCAA and MLB schemes cannot be investment
contracts, futures contracts, forward contracts, or option contracts, the
key issue is whether courts view the NCAA and MLB schemes as
unenforceable wagers, enforceable contracts, or lotteries."' As stated
above, courts should find that the schemes in questions are lotteries;
however, if they do not, the schemes will be enforceable contracts,
rather than unenforceable wagers.
There are three main differences between unenforceable
wagers and enforceable contracts.178 As mentioned above, the US
District Court for the District of New Jersey in Viacom declared that
the transaction is not a wager when "(1) the entry fees are paid
unconditionally;

(2) the prizes offered

to . . . contestants

are for

amounts certain and are guaranteed to be awarded; and (3) [contest
operators] do not compete for the prizes." 7
Based solely on the three factors listed above, both contests will
constitute enforceable contracts, as they both likely meet the three
factors set out in Viacom. The NCAA scheme requires a six-dollar fee
to be paid unconditionally. 18 0 The NCAA knows what prizes it will
award before the contest starts and the number of entrants does not
affect the number of prizes awarded.181 Finally, all of the prizes (the
tickets) will be awarded to the contestants, so the NCAA does not
compete for the prize involved. 182 Therefore, the NCAA scheme is not
a wager.
The MLB scheme works in a similar fashion. It is not a wager
under the first element because the fees on each ticket reservation are
unconditional; no one receives a refund, no matter the result.183 There
is, however, a question as to the second element: whether the MLB
knows the prizes it will award before the contest begins. 184 While
MLB keeps this information confidential, it is safe to assume that
there are a varying number of ticket reservations available for each
team. 185 Since the results of future events, and not the number of

177.
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DCM), 2007 WL 1797648, at *9 (D.N.J.
June 20, 2007).
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Grubner, supra note 2.

181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Newman, supra note 2.
Id.
Id. (noting that the Yankees, for example, were not a part of the ticket program).
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entrants, determine prizes awarded, the MLB scheme will likely
satisfy the second element. 8 6 As for the third element, the prize is the
right to buy a ticket at face value.1'8 When a selected team does not
make the playoffs, the prize never comes into existence.188

Since the

prize fails to come into existence rather than MLB winning the prize,
it is likely that this will satisfy the third element. Thus, the MLB
scheme would probably meet the three-part test set out in Viacom,
classifying the scheme as not a wager.189
A final requirement remains under Viacom and similar
cases.190 If the MLB and NCAA contests are not wagers under
Viacom, courts must then examine whether the consideration paid to
enter the contest is reasonable before concluding that the schemes are
enforceable contracts.191 If it is reasonable, courts will find the
contests to create enforceable contracts. 192 If the consideration paid to
enter the contest is unreasonable, the schemes will be unenforceable
contracts.1 93
While the NCAA has a better claim as to reasonableness (it
charges a flat six-dollar fee per entry), the MLB claim may be
problematic on this front.194 MLB charges a higher service fee (ten
dollars for divisional games, fifteen dollars for league championship
games, and twenty dollars for World Series games) depending on the
reservation purchased.1 9 5 Since the cost of administering the contest
likely does not depend on differences in the underlying events, courts
can call the reasonableness of the MLB scheme fees into question. It
is hard to predict how a court will deal with the MLB scheme's claim
to reasonableness. While a twenty-dollar fee may be reasonable, and
a ten-dollar fee may be reasonable, the fees are clearly not correlated
to the costs of running the contest because the costs for processing the
ticket reservation should not change whether it is a divisional game or
a World Series game.

186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DCM), 2007 WL 1797648, at *9 (D.N.J.
189.
June 20, 2007).
Id. at *8; see also State v. Am. Holiday Ass'n, Inc., 727 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Ariz. 1986)
190.
(holding that "reasonable entrance fees charged by the sponsor of a contest to participants
competing for prizes are not bets or wagers").
Humphrey, 2007 WL 1797648, at *8.
191.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
Grubner, supranote 2.
194.
Newman, supra note 2.
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E. The In Pari Delicto Exception Should Not Bar Entrants to the MLB
and NCAA Schemes from Seeking Restitution
Under the in pari delicto doctrine, a court will not aid a party
by enforcing an illegal contract when that person knew of the illegality
when he entered the contract. 196 The court will simply leave the losses
where they lie. 197 The comments to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts list two situations where a party to an unenforceable
contract has a claim to restitution: (1) the law intends to protect the
offeree and thus views the offeree as less culpable than the offeror,
and (2) the law protects the offeree because the offeror acted in a
misrepresentative or oppressive fashion.19 8 Where the offeror engages
in the transactions in question as a business or in another special
position of trust or confidence, it is more likely that the offeree will be
allowed to seek restitution. 199
A court will probably find that purchasers under either the
NCAA or the MLB scheme are less culpable than the sellers. When
the offeror engages in the transaction as a business, it is more likely
that the court will allow the offeree to seek restitution. 200 The NCAA
and MLB both conduct the contests in question in their capacities as
businesses. 201 Thus, courts will probably allow past contestants to
seek restitution. 20 2
F. The MLB Scheme May Be Invalid under the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
Even if a court finds that the MLB and NCAA schemes are
enforceable contracts under state common law, the MLB procedure
may be illegal under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act of 2006.203 This is because the MLB playoff ticket procedure is run
through an online website. 204 Section 1563 of the Act prevents the
transfer of money in connection with unlawful Internet gambling
where the bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable federal law

§ 197

196.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. cmt. a.
Id. cmt. b.
Id. § 198 cmt. b.
Id.
Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.

202.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

203.
204.

Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.
Newman, supra note 2.

§ 198

(1981).

(1981).

§§

5361-67 (2006).
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or the law of the state in which the bet is "initiated, received, or
otherwise made."2 0 5
It remains to be seen how courts will apply the Act, as only a
few jurisdictions have interpreted the Act so far. The Act states that a
court can sustain an unlawful Internet gambling charge where the
action is illegal in the jurisdiction in which the individual initiates the
bet. 20 6 Chapter thirty-one of U.S.C. § 5365(b)(2) gives state attorney
generals the power to institute proceedings to prevent violations of the
Act. 207
However, Washington, one of the only states to have
interpreted the Act, found that it does not give a state the right to
regulate gambling that originates outside of its jurisdiction. 2 0 8 Thus,
while a potential plaintiff may argue that courts are more likely to
deem the MLB scheme an illegal lottery in a state with harsh lottery
laws, this may not matter if other jurisdictions follow the Supreme
Court of Washington's interpretation that bars states from instituting
actions against out-of-state companies under 31 U.S.C. §5365.209

G. Public Policy Weighs against Finding These Schemes to be Legal
There is a significant difference between privatized gambling
Citizens reap the benefits of
and state-regulated gambling. 210
211 and the state is able to protect its citizens
state-regulated gambling,
from poorly run, deceptive, and private schemes. 212 In both the NCAA
and MLB schemes, the ultimate winner is the corporation. 213
Moreover, neither scheme discloses relevant information such as the
number of tickets available, the odds of winning, or the seat location to
the participants at the time they enter the contest. 2 14
31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A).
205.
Id.
206.
Id. § 5365(b)(2).
207.
208.
Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1087-88 (Wash. 2010) ('"The acts cited recognize and
expressly preserve a state's authority to criminalize some or all gambling activities within the
state's borders, but nothing more.").
Id.
209.
Am. Legion Post # 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
210.
Uncertain Benefits, Hidden Costs: The Perils of State-Sponsored Gambling,
211.
INSTITUTE

ON

TAXATION

AND

ECONOMIC

POLICY

(Oct.

2011),

http://www.itepnet.org/pdfl

pbl9gamb.pdf (noting that states promote gambling as a means of public revenues and to keep
potential gamblers from gambling in other states or participating in illegal activities).
212.
Id.
213. Eamonn Brennan, NCAA Ticket Scalping: Now Totally Legit, ESPN (Jun. 30, 2010,
12:08 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/-lid/12904/ncaa-ticket-scalpingnow-totally-legit.
(noting that the NCAA and MLB have attempted to eat into the profits of scalpers).
214.
Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.

420

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:2:395

According to the US Supreme Court, states have always had to
be wary of attempts to circumvent state lottery law through the
lottery promoter's ingenuity. 215 Because of the way these schemes are
able to change quickly so as to not violate a prior finding of illegal
lottery, courts often have difficulty applying the facts of one case to
another. 216 However, decisions such as the George case give potential
lottery promoters an easy argument as to legality. 217 Thus, if courts
continue to uphold contests such as the ones run by MLB and the
NCAA, it is likely that others will follow until there is a shift in the
In both schemes, demand for a valuable product exceeds
law.
supply. 218 Likewise, both products have a set face value. 219 The
winners of both scenarios pay face value for the product, and all
participants pay for the right to compete to buy the product at face
value. 220
Therefore, if courts uphold these schemes, all that will be
needed to run a legal, private lottery is the availability of a product
with a face value lower than its expected secondary market value. 221
This kind of ingenuity is exactly what the Supreme Court warned of in
1954.222 While this example seems much more malignant and like
gambling than the NCAA and MLB schemes, it functions in the exact
same way. Courts should not sanction a scheme just because it is run
by a reputable corporation and performs a service that some
consumers deem valuable.
III. SOLUTION: BY RETURNING THE CONSIDERATION PAID TO ENTER
THE CONTEST TO THOSE PERSONS WHO Do NOT WIN THE CONTEST,
ORGANIZATIONS CAN AVOID ILLEGAL LOTTERY STATUS IN THE FUTURE
To avoid illegal status, the NCAA and MLB should refund the
consideration contest entrants paid to enter the contest-the service
charge-to those persons who are unable to purchase tickets to the
events. While this will reduce the NCAA's and MLB's profits from the
contests, there are multiple ways to recoup these losses. For example,

215.
FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 292-293 (1954).
216.
Id.
217.
See discussion supraPart II.A (describing the Zinga hypothetical).
218.
Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.
219.
Grubner, supranote 2; Newman, supra note 2.
220.
Grubner, supra note 2; Newman, supra note 2.
221.
For example, a private company will be able set up a website in which it conducts a
contest. At the website the participants can pay a minimal entry fee and the winners will each
receive the option to purchase a good at face value, such as a rare hundred-dollar bill. The face
value of the bill will be equal to its value as currency, but its market value will reflect its rarity.
222.
FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 292-293 (1954).
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both the NCAA and MLB can increase the initial service charge that
an entrant pays to enter the contest. Although this solution will
increase ticket prices for those who win the contest (since the losers
get their initial contest entrance fee refunded, but the winners do not
get to put this service fee towards the price of the ticket), it is exactly
these people-the winners-who do not need the law's protection.2 23
Both the NCAA and MLB could also increase the face value of the
tickets in order to recover the lost profits.
In Lesher v. Baltimore, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated
that the offeree cannot seek the protection of the lottery laws for a
scheme where the winner receives the right to purchase NFL season
tickets and the loser receives his money back, since there is no risk
involved. 224 Both the "winners" and the "losers" of the raffle come out
equal, because the "winners" have to pay a price equal to face value to
get the tickets, ending up with no net gain, and the "losers" do not end
up paying anything, thus ending with no net loss. 2 25
The NCAA scheme is the equivalent of the scheme in Lesher,
except that the NCAA does not return the consideration the losers
paid. 2 2 6 In both schemes the contestants pay full face value to enter
the raffle, but the NCAA scheme includes a six-dollar, non-refundable
transaction fee. 2 2 7 Since the Lesher case is still good law, the safest
way for the NCAA and MLB-assuming New York finds the argument
in Lesher be persuasive-to run ticket schemes is to amend their
policies such that they return the consideration paid to those
contestants that ultimately are unable to purchase tickets to the
event. 228
The MLB scheme requires participants to pay only the
non-refundable portion of the consideration upfront. 229 Thus, so long
as MLB returns the initial consideration to the losers of the contest,
then New York courts will not consider it a lottery. 230 Participants
might even be willing to put more money down initially to reserve
tickets so long as they are guaranteed return of that consideration if
they do not win the contest.

See Lesher v. Baltimore Football Club, 496 N.E.2d 785, 789-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
223.
This is fair because going into the deal, the winners know the price they must ultimately pay for
the ticket, so it is not so much a service charge for them as it is just the price of acquiring the
ticket. See id.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Grubner, supranote 2.
Id.
227.
228.
Lesher, 496 N.E.2d at 790.
Newman, supra note 2.
229.
230.
Id.
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Moreover, Lesher stands for the proposition that where one
party knows that he is entering a contract where another party will
hold his entry fee for some time and earn interest on it, the contract
will not be illegal on this fact alone. 23 1 It is the offeree's duty to
negotiate for interest in such a contract, or to not enter into such a
contract in the first place. 2 3 2 Thus, the fact that the NCAA scheme
and similar schemes asks for money upfront is not an issue.
Therefore, the NCAA and MLB should choose to institute a refundable
service charge rather than allow free entry, because under Lesher the
NCAA and MLB are allowed to earn interest on the participant's
money while they hold it.2 33 This earned interest will help to offset
the loss incurred by ultimately having to return the service charge to
the contest entrants who do not win.
Ultimately, although this solution will increase ticket prices for
those who win the contest (since the service fee will not be put toward
the face value of the tickets for those who win), it is exactly these
people-the winners-who do not need the law's protection. These
persons will ultimately decide that for a certain price they wish to
create a contract with the NCAA or MLB for tickets, and thus will
enter the contest. They will enter into the contract knowing that they
will either receive a ticket in exchange for the service charge they
provided plus the face value of the ticket, or they will receive back
their service charge.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the future, courts should follow the analysis proposed in the
vacated NCAA v. George opinion rather than the analysis used by the
Indiana Supreme Court.2 34 Courts should view both the NCAA and
MLB ticket contests, and other similar schemes sure to arise in the
future, as illegal lotteries run in violation of the organizations'
respective state laws. Both schemes meet the three main elements,
consideration, prize, and chance, that constitute a lottery. These types
of schemes are not legitimate business transactions, future contracts,
forward contracts, or option contracts, and therefore cannot be saved
by attempting to classify the transactions as such. By viewing these
schemes and similar schemes as illegal lotteries, courts will put an
end to the potential proliferation of copycat contests before they begin.
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233.
Id. at 790.
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Organizations that choose to hold such contests should return the
consideration the contestants paid to enter the contest if the
contestants do not win the prize. By returning the consideration-the
entry fee-to those persons who do not win, the organization cannot be
found to be conducting an illegal lottery because there cannot be a
lottery without prize, chance, and consideration.2 3 5
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